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Trial Practice and Procedure
by
Jason L. Crawford*
J. Clay Fuller*
Dustin T. Brown*

and
Kate S. Cook""
I.

INTRODUCTION

During this survey period, the Georgia Supreme Court and Georgia
Court of Appeals issued several noteworthy opinions on topics of interest
to practitioners. This Article will address these judicial opinions that
cover, among other topics, the issues of damages, immunity, the
attorney-client relationship, indemnification, jurisdiction and venue,
statutes of limitation, standing, and trial procedure. This Article will
also address several developments in Georgia's statutory law impacting
trial practice and procedure.

* Partner in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Crawford, LLP,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. Georgia State University (B.B.A-, magna cum laud6,
1990); University of Georgia (J.D., magna cum laude, 1993). Member, State Bar of
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Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.A., 1988); University of Georgia
(J.D., magna cum laude, 1999). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
*** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Crawford, LLP,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. University of Georgia (B.B., 1999); University of
Georgia (J.D., summa cum laude, 2002). Member, State Bar of Georgia and Alabama State
Bar.
**** Associate in the firm of Butler, Wooten, Fryhofer, Daughtery & Crawford, LLP,
Columbus and Atlanta, Georgia. University of the South (B.A., magna cum laude, 1998);
Walter F. George School of Law, Mercer University (J.D., magna cum laude, 2002).
Member, State Bar of Georgia.
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CASE LAW

Damages

1. Punitive Damages. In Kothari v. Patel,' the Georgia Court of
Appeals clarified that a plaintiff need only prove specific intent to cause
harm by a preponderance of the evidence in order to lift the statutory
cap on punitive damages 2 under section 51-12-5.1(f) of the Official Code
of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.). 8 In Kothari defendants-appellants
argued that the trial court misconstrued Time WarnerEntertainmentCo.
v. Six Flags Over Georgia4 when the trial court held that 7me Warner
supported its finding that "the evidentiary standard set forth in
subsection (b) [of O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1] for proving that punitive
damages are appropriate, requiring clear and convincing evidence, [does
not apply] to subsection (f), to show the specific intent to harm necessary
to lift the monetary cap."' The court of appeals concluded that the
opinion rendered in Time Warner did not address the evidentiary
standard needed to lift the statutory cap on punitive damages.6
However, the court of appeals determined that the trial court had
applied the correct burden of proof under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-5.1(f).
In reaching its decision, the court of appeals reasoned that O.C.G.A.
section 51-12-5.1 should be strictly construed because it is in derogation
of the common law, which requires punitive damages to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence. 8 Because there is no mention of "clear
and convincing evidence" within subsection (f) of the statute, and
because Time Warner does not address which standard of proof should
be applied, the court of appeals held that the trial court was justified in
finding that the plaintiff need only prove specific intent by a preponderance of the evidence. 9
2. Prejudgment Interest. The Georgia Court of Appeals has
addressed how prejudgment interest may be awarded in several cases

1. 262 Ga. App. 168, 585 S.E.2d 97 (2003).
2. Id. at 174, 585 S.E.2d at 102.
3. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1(f) (2000).
4. 245 Ga. App. 334, 537 S.E.2d 397 (2000), vacated on other grounds, 534 U.S. 801
(2001).
5. Kothari, 262 Ga. App. at 172, 585 S.E,2d at 101.
6. Id., 585 S.E.2d at 101-02.
7. Id. at 173-74, 585 S.E.2d at 102.

8. Id.
9. Id.
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over this last survey year. First, in Security Life Insurance Co. v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co.,'° the court of appeals determined
that set-off agreements could not be used to reach the final verdict
amount when considering whether a plaintiff was entitled to prejudgment interest" under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14.12
In the same
opinion, the court of appeals also decided that postjudgment interest
may contribute to an overall verdict amount when determining whether
a plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. section 5112-14.13 Second, in Bennett v. Mullally, 4 the court of appeals held
that a settlement demand for unliquidated damages is properly served
under O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14 if the settlement demand is tendered to
a defendant's attorney, and prejudgment interest accruing under
O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14 may continue to run while the parties are
awaiting a new trial, even though the delay is by no fault of the party
against whom interest is accruing.'" Third, in Schoenbaum Ltd. Co.,
LLC v. Lenox Pines, LLC, 6 the court of appeals concluded that parties
are not entitled to have interest abated upon surrendering money to the
court's registry under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-67'1 if the payment is made
pursuant to a court order.'8
In Security Life appellants-plaintiffs had previously made a settlement
demand against all joint defendants pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 51-1214 for $4,000,000 to resolve their fraud and RICO claims stemming from
an agent's forgery of plaintiffs' signatures on a health insurance
application form. After the verdict and award of attorney fees had been
rendered, appealed, and remanded six times, the judgment finally came
down to a compensatory award to plaintiffs of $4,073,000 and an award
of attorney fees of $306,290.98. However, plaintiffs had previously
settled with two other joint tortfeasors for a combined total of $410,000.
Therefore, although plaintiffs' total verdict after appeal was $4,379,290.98, the total judgment rendered for plaintiffs equaled $3,969,290.98,
which was less than their demand for unliquidated damages under
O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14.9 The Georgia Court of Appeals, disapprov-

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

263 Ga. App. 525, 588 S.E.2d 319 (2003).
Id. at 536, 588 S.E.2d at 327.
O.C.G.A. § 51-12-14 (2004).
Security Life, 263 Ga. App. at 526, 588 S.E.2d at 321.
263 Ga. App. 215, 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003).
Id. at 219, 587 S.E.2d at 389.
262 Ga. App. 457, 585 S.E.2d 643 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-67 (1993).
Schoenbaum Ltd., 262 Ga. App. at 460, 585 S.E.2d at 648-49.
Security Life, 263 Ga. App. at 525-27, 532-34, 588 S.E.2d at 320-21, 324-26.
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ing its decision in Restina v. Crawford,2" held that plaintiffs were
entitled to prejudgment interest because O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14
requires the verdict, not the final judgment reflecting set-offs to the
verdict, to equal or exceed a plaintiff's settlement demand for liquidated
damages.21
Security Life, appellee-defendant, also appealed the trial court's
inclusion of accrued postjudgment interest totaling $112,110.99 to
plaintiffs' compensatory award for fraud in one of the trial court's
modified orders, which the trial court then used to determine whether
plaintiffs were entitled to prejudgment interest under O.C.G.A. section
51-12-14.2 The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's actions and
held that O.C.G.A. sections 51-12-14 and 7-4-12' must be read in pari
materia "because post-judgment interest at 12 percent is intended to
deter post-judgment delay, motions, and appeals, and to bring finality
to judgments or [make the defendant pay] the price of the protracted
post-judgment litigation."'
In Bennett plaintiff-appellee Mullally sued Bennett over injuries she
sustained when Bennett hit her with his truck while she was legally
crossing a street. Bennett received a defense verdict at the first trial.
The trial court granted Mullally's motion for new trial, which then
resulted in a verdict of $128,359 in damages for plaintiff. This verdict
exceeded Mullally's unliquidated damages settlement demand of
$100,000. The court entered judgment upon the verdict and awarded
prejudgment interest accruing from thirty days after the date of
Mullally's settlement demand letter, which had been conveyed to
Bennett's lawyer, but not to Bennett personally.2 5 The court of appeals,
6 held that Mullally
distinguishing the case of Resnik v. Pittman,"
properly gave notice of the settlement demand by sending the letter
2
This holding makes sense because a
directly to Bennett's lawyerY.
20. 205 Ga. App. 887, 424 S.E.2d 79 (1992).
21. Security Life, 263 Ga. App. at 527-28, 588 S.E.2d at 321-22.
22. Id at 529, 588 S.E.2d at 323. Because Security Life did not move for a set-off from
the court's judgment immediately upon the rendering of the judgment, interest accrued on
the unpaid portion of the judgment until the trial court issued an order granting the set-off.
23. O.C.GA § 7-4-12 (2004).
24. Security Life, 263 Ga. App. at 529, 588 S.E.2d at 323. But see id. at 534-35, 588
S.E.2d at 326 (Andrews, J., dissenting) (Justices Andrews and Blackburn's dissent
contesting the characterization of the order providing for the inclusion of the accrued
interest as a "judgment" for purposes of O.C.GA. § 7-4-12 and also concluding that the
majority's decision allowed for the unlawful imposition of interest upon interest).
25. Bennett, 263 Ga. App. at 215-16, 219, 587 S.E.2d at 387, 389.
26. 203 Ga. App. 835, 418 S.E.2d 116 (1992).
27. Bennett, 263 Ga. App. at 219, 587 S.E.2d at 389. In Resnick the court of appeals
held that "notice to an insurance claims adjustor does not constitute notice to a tortfeasor
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plaintiff or practitioner may not ethically communicate with anyone but
the lawyer of a represented party. The court of appeals also gave short
shrift to Bennett's argument that the trial court should not have
calculated prejudgment interest while the parties were waiting to retry
2
the case, because that delay was outside Bennett's control. " The court
of appeals noted that at all times Bennett retained the ability to settle
not
the case for $100,000 and that O.C.G.A. section 51-12-14 "does
period." 29
establish any exceptions to the running of the interest
In Schoenbaum two real estate developers engaged in litigation over
a terminated contract to develop an upscale apartment complex. The
defendant-developer, Schoenbaum, argued that it should be excused from
paying the prejudgment interest that was provided for in the parties'
contract because it was protected under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-67, which
provides for the abatement of interest when the relief sought by the
litigation is deposited into the court's registry with notice to all parties
and by leave of court.3 0 The court of appeals held that the developer
was not entitled to protection under O.C.G.A. section 9-11-67 because it
deposited the money pursuant to a court order, rather than voluntarily
seeking the trial court's leave to do so. 1
Immunity

B.

2
In Departmentof Human Resources v. Johnson, the court of appeals
Johnson's son, a juvenile
addressed a significant immunity issue.'
offender, died while in the custody of Broken Shackle Ranch, Inc.
("Broken Shackle") when the boy was electrocuted while sweeping behind
a freezer. Johnson sued Broken Shackle, the Department of Juvenile
34
Justice ("DJJ"), and the Department of Human Resources ("DHR").
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's ruling that the DJJ and
DHR had waived sovereign immunity by virtue of Broken Shackle being
a state employee.3"
In reversing, the court of appeals disapproved of the trial court's use
of general respondeat superior principles to determine a party's status

as required by the statute .... " Id. However, the court of appeals in Resnick specifically
.noted that the adjustor was not the claimant's attorney." Id.
28. Id. at 220, 587 S.E.2d at 389.
29. Id
30. Schoenbaum, 262 Ga. App. at 460, 585 S.E.2d at 648.

31. Id. at 460-61, 585 S.E.2d at 648-49.
32.

264 Ga. App. 730, 592 S.E.2d 124 (2003).

33. Id. at 730, 592 S.E.2d at 126.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 736, 592 S.E.2d at 130.
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under the Georgia Tort Claims Act ("GTCA").36 Any waiver of sovereign immunity must be explicit, and the GTCA itself contains its own
definition of "employee," which is far more narrow than the meaning of
employee under the law of respondeat superior.37 Additionally, the
GTCA specifically states that a corporation cannot be an employee for
GTCA purposes. Therefore, Broken Shackle, a corporation, could not be
an employee of either the DJJ or DHR.38
C.

Preemption
During this survey period, one noteworthy preemption case surfaced.
In Vo v. Yamaha Golf-Car Co.,39 the court of appeals held that state
law survival actions are preempted by the federal Death On The High
Seas Act.40 Because it is established that state law wrongful death
actions are preempted, 4' this ruling means, as a practical matter,
recovery is limited to pecuniary loss for deaths occurring more than a
marine league, which is approximately 3.45 statute miles, offshore.
D.

DeclaratoryJudgment Actions
In Drawdy v. Direct General Insurance Co.,4 2 the Georgia Supreme
Court gave notice that it takes jurisdictional issues as seriously in
declaratory judgment actions as in other cases.43 In Drawdy the
insurer unconditionally denied liability coverage for an automobile wreck
involving its insured. The insurer then sought a declaratory judgment
to establish the merits of its coverage position. However, no underlying
tort suit had been filed against the insured when the insurer filed the
declaratory judgment action. No actual controversy thus existed because
no uncertainty existed for the insurer on which future course of action
should be chosen among alternatives."
The court of appeals allowed the action to go forward because the
injured party filed suit against the insured, and the insurer defended
under a reservation of rights after the declaratory judgment action was

36. O.C.G.A. §§ 50-21-20 to -37 (2002); Johnson, 264 Ga. App. at 735-36, 592 S.E.2d at
129.
37. Johnson, 264 Ga. App. at 736, 592 S.E.2d at 130.
38. Id. at 734, 592 S.E.2d at 128.
39. 267 Ga. App. 742, 600 S.E.2d 594 (2004).
40. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-67 (2000); Vo, 267 Ga. App. at 743, 600 S.E.2d at 595.

41. Vo, 267 Ga. App. at 745, 600 S.E.2d at 596.
42. 277 Ga. 107, 586 S.E.2d 228 (2003).
43. Id. at 107-08, 586 S.E.2d at 229.
44. Id. at 109-10, 586 S.E.2d at 230-31.

2004]

TRIAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE

439

filed.45 In reversing the court of appeals, the supreme court properly
held that standing is a jurisdictional issue to be assessed at the time the
lawsuit is filed." It was undisputed that at the time the declaratory
judgment action was filed, no actual controversy existed.47
E. Attorney-Client Relationship
In Cooper Chiropractic Health Clinic v. Quezada,4 the court of
appeals addressed a rather intriguing "contractual" arrangement.4 9 In
Quezada Chaney Alexander received treatment from Cooper Chiropractic
Health Clinic ("CCHC") for injuries suffered in an automobile accident.5" Alexander "then retained Quezada to help him obtain compensation for his injuries."5 1 CCHC and Alexander entered into an
assignment contract, which provided that CCHC would provide
treatment without seeking immediate payment and, rather, would accept
payment from insurance or any proceeds from resolution of a lawsuit.
The contract also purported to require Alexander's attorney, Quezada,
After
to pay CCHC out of any proceeds received from a lawsuit.
Quezada negotiated a settlement for Alexander's injury claims, CCHC
demanded that Quezada pay Alexander's outstanding charges. CCHC
eventually filed suit against Quezada."2 In affirming the grant of
summary judgment for Quezada, the court of appeals stated that even
"ta]ssuming that Quezada agreed to the terms of the contract, it cannot
be enforced because it lacks consideration" due to the fact that no benefit
flowed from CCHC to Quezada for the provision of medical treatment to
Quezada's client.53
The supreme court, in In re Unauthorized Practice of Law ("UPL")
Advisory Opinion 2002-1,5' provided guidance with respect to if and
when the efforts of a bill collector constitute the unauthorized practice
of law.5 The court concluded that in situations where the non-attorney
collector accepts transfer of an outstanding account for a set fee or
contingency fee, the collector is engaging in the unauthorized practice of

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

See Direct Gen. Ins. Co. v. Drawdy, 258 Ga. App. 149, 572 S.E.2d 629 (2002).
Drawdy, 277 Ga. at 109, 586 S.E.2d at 230.
Id.
263 Ga. App. 214, 587 S.E.2d 392 (2003).
Id. at 214, 587 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 214-15, 587 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 214, 587 S.E.2d at 393.
Id. at 215, 587 S.E.2d at 393.
Id.
277 Ga. 521, 591 S.E.2d 822 (2004).
Id. at 522, 591 S.E.2d at 823.
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law.' On the other hand, if there is an "actual, legal transfer of the
overdue account to the collector, thereby relinquishing all interest in the
account, then the collector would be representing only his or her own
interest" and thus would not be engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law."
F Indemnification
In National Gypsum of Georgia v. Ploof CarriersCorp.,s the Georgia
Court of Appeals overruled its decision in Proctor & Gamble Paper
Products Co. v. Yeargin Construction Co.,59 and held that, based upon
the standard language in an indemnity agreement between the parties,
Ploof must indemnify National Gypsum from a judgment unless the
underlying injury was caused solely by National Gypsum's own
negligence.' National Gypsum, a wallboard manufacturer, and Ploof,
a trucking company, entered into an indemnity agreement which, in
essence, provided that Ploof would indemnify, hold harmless, and defend
National Gypsum for claims from Ploof's employees unless the underlying damage or injury was caused by the sole negligence of National
Gypsum. After a Ploof employee was injured on the premises of
National Gypsum, the employee sued National Gypsum, and National
Gypsum filed a third-party complaint against Ploof seeking to enforce
the indemnity provision.6 In considering whether Ploof was entitled
to summary judgment on National Gypsum's indemnity claim, the trial
court relied upon the court of appeals decision in Proctor & Gamble,
which quoted Binswanger Glass Co. v. Beers Construction Co.,62 as
follows:
If only contributory negligence on the part of the employee [of the
indemnitor] ... is shown and no showing is made that the employer

[indemnitor] is negligent in any other way, then the contract may not
be construed in such a manner as to indemnify the [indemnitee] for its
own acts of negligence.'

56. Id. at 521-22, 591 S.E.2d at 823.
57. Id. at 522, 591 S.E.2d at 823.
58. 266 Ga. App. 565, 597 S.E.2d 597 (2004).
59. 196 Ga. App. 216, 396 S.E.2d 38 (1990), overruled by Natl Gypsum of Ga. v. Ploof
Carriers Corp., 266 Ga. App. 565, 597 S.E.2d 597 (2004).
60. Nat'l Gypsum, 266 Ga. App. at 565-68, 597 S.E.2d at 597-600.
61. Id. at 565, 597 S.E.2d at 598.
62. 141 Ga. App. 715, 234 S.E.2d 363 (1977).
63. Nat'l Gypsum, 266 Ga. App. at 568, 597 S.E.2d at 600 (alterations in the original)
(quoting Binswanger, 141 Ga. App. at 719, 234 S.E.2d at 366).
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After taking into account this statement of law in Binswanger and
Proctor & Gamble, the trial court in National Gypsum granted Ploof
summary judgment on National Gypsum's indemnity claim because
there was no issue of Ploof's negligence other than the negligence of its
injured employee."
The court of appeals held, however, that the opinion of Proctor &
Gamble failed to notice that the indemnification agreement at issue in
Binswanger contained language that was not present in the indemnity
agreement of Proctor & Gamble.65 "In Binswanger, the indemnity
provision required that the injury be caused by the negligence of the
indemnitor or those under its control; the clause at issue in Proctor &
Gamble contained no such requirement."' The court of appeals further
noted that the indemnification agreements in NationalGypsum, Stafford
Enterprises v. American Cyanamid Co.,67 and Proctor & Gamble were
all substantially similar." As such, Proctor & Gamble was deemed to
be wrongfully decided, and is now overruled, and practitioners must once
again read each indemnification agreement carefully to determine
whether indemnification will lie.69
G.

Jurisdictionand Venue

In Nalley v. Baldwin,7 ° the court of appeals was faced with the
question of "whether a consent judgment entered against the sole
resident defendantljoint tortfeasor amounts to a 'discharge[] from
liability' within the meaning of the amended venue statute, O.C.G.A. § 910-31(b),71 thereby entitling the nonresident defendants/joint tortfeasors
to transfer the action."72 The court of appeals noted that "instead of a
dismissal, a consent judgment was entered against [the resident
defendant/joint tortfeasor]" in conjunction with the settlement release.73
The court held that, irrespective of the wording of the settlement and
release, the "entry of a consent judgment does not equate with a

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
in the

Id. at 567, 597 S.E.2d at 599.
Id. at 569, 597 S.E.2d at 600.
Id. (citations omitted).
164 Ga. App. 646, 297 S.E.2d 307 (1992).
Nat'l Gypsum, 266 Ga. App. at 569, 597 S.E.2d at 600.
Id.
261 Ga. App. 713, 583 S.E.2d 544 (2003).
O.C.G.A. § 9-10-31(b) (2004). This statute provides: "If all defendants who reside
county in which an action is pending are discharged from liability before the

commencement of trial, a nonresident defendant may require that the case be transferred
to a county and court in which venue would otherwise be proper."
72. Naley, 261 Ga. App. at 713, 583 S.E.2d at 545.
73. Id.
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discharge from liability."7 4 For trial practitioners, the importance of
this ruling should not be overlooked. In order to prevent the transfer of
venue upon settlement with a joint tortfeasor who is the sole resident of
the county in which the action is pending, practitioners should simply
negotiate the entry of a consent judgment, rather than dismissal, as a
condition of the settlement if they want to avoid transfer to another
venue.
With respect to jurisdiction and venue for counterclaims, the court of
appeals held in Kennestone Hospital, Inc. v. Hopson7 5 that a party who
files suit submits himself to the venue and jurisdiction of that court for
all matters directly connected with that suit.76 Even after summary
judgment was entered on plaintiff's main claim, such that only the
counterclaim remained, the court held that venue for defendant's
counterclaim was appropriate in the county of defendant's residence-where the action was originally filed." The court rejected the
argument that because the original plaintiff was now the only defendant,
proper venue lay in the original plaintiff's county of residence.7"
MalpracticeLitigation
The court of appeals took the opportunity to add, yet again, to the
mountain of case and statutory law interpreting and applying the
professional negligence affidavit statute7 9 that is designed to cut down
on litigation. In Smith v. Morris, Manning & Martin,LLP, 0 the court
of appeals held emphatically that the filing of a professional malpractice
claim with a defective affidavit does not render the lawsuit void from
inception."1 In fact, a plaintiff in a malpractice action may freely
amend his or her complaint to add new claims not subject to the
affidavit requirement, such as intentional tort claims, to cure a defective
affidavit.8 2 This holding serves as another sensible interpretation of
the statute to ensure that it is applied fairly and not as a malpractice
trap.
H.

74. Id. at 715, 583 S.E.2d at 546.
75. 264 Ga. App. 123, 589 S.E.2d 696 (2003).
76. Id. at 124, 589 S.E.2d at 698.

77. Id.
78. Id.
79. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-9.1 (2004).

80. 264 Ga. App. 24, 589 S.E.2d 840 (2004).
81. Id at 25, 589 S.E.2d at 842.
82. Id., 589 S.E.2d at 843.
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Standing

In Gonzalez v. Department of Transportation,3 the court of appeals
rendered an opinion that grants the state complete immunity from suits
brought by non-resident aliens. Despite the Georgia Tort Claims Act, as
well as statutes declaring that citizens of other countries shall have the
right to sue in Georgia courts, 4 the appellate court completely foreclosed the possibility of an injured, non-resident alien successfully suing
the State of Georgia. 5 In so holding the court of appeals reasoned that
the Georgia statutes extending the right of access to Georgia courts to
"aliens" does not actually extend to "non-resident aliens," despite the
lack of statutory support for such a distinction. 6
The Georgia Tort Claims Act only extends jurisdiction to claims that
are brought in the Georgia county where the loss occurred. 7 Therefore,
the unfortunate effect of this decision, which the court of appeals
recognized unapologetically, is to deny non-resident aliens, injured by
access to any court, even one sitting in the alien's home
the State,
88
country.
The court of appeals grounded the rationale of its decision upon the
supreme court decision of AT&T Corp. v. Sigala,"9 a case that was
dismissed based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens.' In Sigala
the court rejected plaintiff's argument that a non-resident alien was
statutorily granted access to Georgia courts, making the distinction that
the statutes do not extend access to non-resident aliens.9' In recognizing the applicability of forum non conveniens, however, the supreme
court concluded that another venue existed in Venezuela where the
claims at issue could be pursued.92 Accordingly, the supreme court in
Sigala did not need to interpret Georgia law to deny non-resident aliens
access to the Georgia courts, particularly when the person was injured
in this state by a resident of this state.9 3 The court of appeals,

83.
84.
85.

265 Ga. App. 610, 594 S.E.2d 783 (2004).
O.C.G.A. §§ 1-2-10 to -11 (2000).
Gonzales, 265 Ga. App. at 611, 594 S.E.2d at 785.

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 611-12, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 611, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
Id. at 612, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
274 Ga. 137, 549 S.E.2d 373 (2001).
Id. at 141, 549 S.E.2d at 378.
Id.
Id. at 137, 549 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at 140, 549 S.E.2d at 377.
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however, determined that it was constrained to follow the supreme
court's earlier decision when it decided Gonzales.9'
J. Statutes of Limitation
In Barnes v. Turner,95 Barnes sold his auto parts business and
financed $180,000 of the purchase price to be repaid over a period of
more than ten years. For purposes of securing the loan, Barnes was
represented by an attorney with respect to the sale and with respect to
the filing of the required Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") financing
"Georgia law requires that, in order to be effective
statements.'
beyond five years, these UCC forms must be renewed" by filing a
continuation statement within the six month period before the five year
expiration date.97 Unfortunately for Barnes, his attorney failed to file
this continuation statement, or to even mention the requirement to
Barnes. The buyer then defaulted on Barnes's newly unsecured loan,
leaving Barnes with no recourse against the buyer. Barnes sued his
attorney for failing to renew the UCC financing forms or to inform
Barnes that the forms had to be renewed.9'
In the legal malpractice action that followed, Barnes acknowledged
that the statute of limitations was four years from the date of the
alleged incident of malpractice; but Barnes contended that "until he
actually incurred damages, no cause of action existed, and this did not
occur until the UCC continuation statements had not been fied during
the six months prior to" five years from the date of the original filing of
the UCC statements. 9 Barnes also argued that because the attorney
continued to represent him following the closing of the sale, the attorney
had an ongoing duty to notify Barnes of the need to fie a continuation
statement. 1°° In affirming the dismissal of Barnes's claims, the court
rejected those arguments and stated that: (1) a right of action arises
immediately upon the wrongful act having been committed, thereby
triggering the statute of limitation and (2) a subsequent act by which the
attorney could have avoided the ultimate effect of the "original breach
of duty does not inflict new harm which would begin the statute of

94. Gonzales, 265 Ga. App. at 612, 594 S.E.2d at 785.
95. 265 Ga. App. 6, 593 S.E.2d 9 (2003).
96. Id. at 6, 593 S.E.2d at 9-10.
97. Id at 7, 593 S.E.2d at 10.
98. Id. While somewhat obvious, it is important to note that Barnes did not know of
the attorney's failure until after the five-year mark for filing the continuation statement
had passed.
99. Id. at 8, 593 S.E.2d at 10.
100. Id. at 9, 593 S.E.2d at 10-11.
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limitation again."'O' Considering the fact that a continuation statement cannot be filed until at least four and a half years after the
original transaction, and that the statute of limitation for legal
malpractice is four years from the date of malpractice, steadfast
adherence to the application of these principles would appear to provide
attorneys who fail their clients in this fashion with virtual immunity
from suit. Recognizing this conundrum, the court of appeals noted that
any "changes in these principles ...

are within the purview of the

"1 2
legislature or the [slupreme [clourt, not this court. 0
In McCandliss v. Cox Enterprises, Inc.,"° the court of appeals held
that the single publication rule 1 ' applies to internet postings, and
thus, the statute of limitations for injuries to the reputation commences
upon the date of initial publication. 0 5 In McCandliss plaintiff argued
that because a web site may be altered at any time by its publisher and
because internet postings are available only to those who seek them,
"each... viewing of the [article] should be considered a new publication
that retriggers the statute of limitations."" 6 The court rejected that
argument and stated that the "policies impelling the original adoption
of the single publication rule support its application to the posting" on
a website, and thus, the statute of limitations is triggered upon the
initial publication.' 1 The court felt that adoption of a

multiple publication rule [for internet postings] would implicate an
even greater potential for endless retriggering of the statute of limitations, multiplicity of suits and harassment of defendants. Inevitably,
there would be a serious inhibitory effect on the open, pervasive
dissemination of information and ideas over the Internet, which is, of
course, its greatest beneficial promise.'
In a case that may be of particular interest, the court of appeals
explained in Burnham v. Coney"° when the right of action accrues in
an action to recover fees for legal services." Simply put, to determine
when the right of action accrues, the underlying fee contract must be

101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 10, 593 S.E.2d at 11-12.
Id., 593 S.E.2d at 12.
265 Ga. App. 377, 379, 593 S.E.2d 856, 858 (2004).
Id. at 378, 593 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 379, 593 S.E.2d at 858.

106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id at 379-80, 593 S.E.2d at 858.
109. 265 Ga. App. 246, 593 S.E.2d 701 (2004).
110. Id. at 247-48, 593 S.E.2d at 703.
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"Where an attorney is entitled to be paid only after a
analyzed."
particular result is procured, the attorney's right of action does not
accrue until the right to the fee is earned by procurement of the
result.""2 On the other hand, when the fee contract entitled the
attorney to receive payment of fees during the progress of the representation, the cause of action for payment of fees accrues as the services are
rendered."'
In Brahn v. Young," 4 the court of appeals had an opportunity to
interpret and apply the supreme court's rejection" 5 of the continuous
treatment doctrine." 6 In Brahn Sylvia Young was treated for an
infection by Dr. Brahn in January 1998 and also on two subsequent
occasions in July 1998. Due to the doctor's alleged negligent failure to
properly diagnose and treat the infection, Young brought a lawsuit more
than two years after the January 1998 treatment but within two years
of the July 1998 treatments." 7 Young contended that she was not
relying on the continuous treatment doctrine that had already been
rejected by the supreme court in Young v. Williams."' Sylvia Young
attempted to distinguish her case by noting that the defendant in
Williams "never made a misdiagnosis within the statute of limitations
period," whereas Dr. Brahn "misdiagnosed Young's condition at least
twice within the limitation period, during the last two visits."" 9
Young contended that those alleged misdiagnoses during the last two
visits constituted "separate negligence actions," and therefore, her action
was timely filed. 2 ° The court rejected this argument, holding that
"the fact that Brahn may have continued to misdiagnose her condition
beyond January 1, 1998, was not controlling" and that the statute
commenced at the time of that visit because "[alt least by that date,
Brahn's 'act of alleged negligence had occurred and the injury had
manifested itself [to Young].'""' Contrary to Young's argument that
"[niegligence on one day does not grant a physician immunity from

111. Id. at 248, 593 S.E.2d at 703-04.
112. Id., 593 S.E.2d at 703.
113. Id., 593 S.E.2d 704.
114. 265 Ga. App. 705, 595 S.E.2d 553 (2004).
115. Id. at 707, 595 S.E.2d at 555. See Young v. Williams, 274 Ga. 845, 560 S.E.2d 690
(2002) (rejecting continuous treatment doctrine).
116. Brahn, 265 Ga. App. at 707, 595 S.E.2d at 555.
117. Id. at 706, 595 S.E.2d at 554.
118. 274 Ga. 845, 560 S.E.2d 690 (2002).
119. Brahn, 265 Ga. App. at 708, 595 S.E.2d at 555-56.
120. Id. at 708-09, 595 S.E.2d at 556.
121. Id. at 709, 595 S.E.2d at 556 (quoting Frankel v. Clark, 213 Ga. App. 222, 223,444
S.E.2d 147, 149 (1994)).
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negligence on the following day," it appears that in some circumstances
it may do just that."2
Future victims of malpractice, like Young,
should plead their claims meticulously. They should avoid any claims
based on the acts that occurred outside the actionable period altogether.
If a litigant's claims were based only on actions that occurred within the
actionable period, a court would be hard pressed to grant summary
judgment based on the statute of limitations.
K

Tials, Evidence, and Juries

1. Right to Open and Close at Trial. This survey period includes
an interesting premises liability case decided by the court of appeals,
TMG Ashley Lakes, Inc. v. Jennings.'
The case sensibly reaffirms
that an employer may be found liable for negligent hiring and retention,
even if the employee's tort was committed outside the scope of employment, so long as the victim came into contact with the employee as a
result of the victim's relationship with the employer."
As a matter of trial procedure, the court's opinion attempts to provide
guidance on the issue of when a defendant who presents no evidence at
trial has the right to open and close arguments. 2 ' Four defendants
were all represented by the same lawyer, who had asked for and
received permission from the trial court to examine his clients directly
after plaintiff called them for cross-examination in plaintiff's case-inchief. When the time came for closing arguments, the trial court allowed
plaintiff to open and close because, according to the trial court,
defendants had introduced evidence
by counsel's direct examinations
26
during plaintiffs case-in-chief.
The majority, apparently recognizing that merely conducting a direct
examination of one's client after cross-examination by plaintiff does not
waive the right to open and close, still held that defendants lost the
right to open and close. 127 In so holding, the majority discussed an
exchange between defense counsel and the trial court when defense
counsel was urging the trial court to exercise its discretion and allow
defense counsel the opportunity to directly examine his clients during

122. Id. at 707, 595 S.E.2d at 555.
123. 264 Ga. App. 456, 590 S.E.2d 807 (2003).
124. Id. at 462, 590 S.E.2d at 815.
125. Id. at 465, 590 S.E.2d at 817-18.
126. Id. at 467, 590 S.E.2d at 818; id. at 471, 590 S.E.2d at 821 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting).
127. Id. at 467, 590 S.E.2d at 818; see also id. at 471, 590 S.E.2d at 821 (Andrews, J.,
dissenting) (citing Colwell v. Voyager Cas. Ins. Co., 251 Ga. 744, 747, 309 S.E.2d 617, 61920 (1983)).
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plaintiff's case-in-chief. 1
The majority focused on the fact that, in
this discussion, defense counsel led the trial court to believe that
defendants would be introducing evidence in their case-in-chief later in
the trial."2 The appellate court never explained why this exchange
caused defendants to lose their right to open and close arguments, but
the decision seems to be the correct one. s0 If defense counsel had
stated, forthrightly, his strategy of examining his clients during the
plaintiff's case, so that he could safely rest at the conclusion of the
plaintiff's case and thereby open and close arguments, the trial court
might have ruled differently.
2. Evidence. Several cases decided in this survey period highlight
the basic principles of when evidence can be admitted; the consequences
of failing to do so properly; and the proper opportunity to respond, which
must be afforded a party when the trial court excuses the other party
from strict compliance with the rules. In Oakes v. Magat," the court
of appeals applied the rule set out in O.C.G.A. section 9-11-56(e),' 2
which requires certified or sworn copies of papers relied upon in moving
for summary judgment."
In response to a summary judgment
motion, plaintiffs submitted an expert affidavit. However, plaintiffs'
expert had relied on medical records that were not attached to his
affidavit or otherwise in the record."3 The expert affiant's conclusions
were thus held to be inadmissible, and this shortcoming delivered a fatal
blow to plaintiffs' claims.' 3
Similarly, in Keyser v. Allied Holdings, Inc.," the court of appeals
held that failing to include the words "personal knowledge" in an
affidavit warranted reversal of summary judgment in favor of an
employer who had alleged that a former employee had breached
confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreements.'3 7 Because the statements of plaintiff's vice president were made only to the best of his
knowledge, these statements amounted to nothing more than unsworn

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id. at 467, 590 S.E.2d at 818-19.
Id, 590 S.E.2d at 819.
Id. at 468, 590 S.E.2d at 819.
263 Ga. App. 165, 587 S.E.2d 150 (2003).
O.C.GA § 9-11-56(c) (1993).
Oakes, 263 Ga. App. at 166, 587 S.E.2d at 151.

134. Id.
135. Id. at 167, 587 S.E.2d at 152.
136. 266 Ga. App. 192, 596 S.E.2d 713 (2004).

137. Id. at 193, 596 S.E.2d at 715.
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allegations. 13
The court of appeals thus reversed the trial court's
3 9
grant of summary judgment."
In Harrell v. Federal National Payables,Inc.,'" the court of appeals
determined that opposing counsel must be given an opportunity to
respond when a practitioner, without leave of court, notices a mistake
and files an affidavit after the summary judgment hearing. 4'
In
Harrell plaintiff filed supplemental affidavits after a hearing to correct
a deficiency in laying the foundation for the business records exception
to the hearsay rule. The trial court denied defendants' motion to strike
The
the affidavits and entered summary judgment for plaintiff."4
court of appeals reversed, reasoning that when a court allows the filing
of a supplemental affidavit it must also give the respondent sufficient
time to respond to the supplemental affidavits, similar to when courts
require that motions for summary judgment be filed at least thirty days
prior to the time fixed for the hearing. 14
A basic principle in the law of trial practice is that a party should
have a fair chance to respond when a court exercises its discretion to
allow another party to deviate from the rules.'" In Shepherd Interiors, Inc. v. City of Atlanta,'" the court allowed a city employee, who
had not been specifically named on the witness list, to testify about the
value of property at issue in this case.'" The court of appeals ruled
that the city did not meet its burden of identifying its witness by
generally listing a category of city employees. 47 Once the trial court
exercised its discretion to allow the improperly disclosed witness to
testify, the opposing party, as a matter of right, could interview the
witness and even postpone the trial to check the facts and prepare a
rebuttal.' 4"
In Jackson v. Heard,49 the court of appeals tackled a tricky application of the balance between prejudice and probative value. 50 Heard

138. Id.
139. Id.
140.

141.
142.
143.
144.
641-42
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

264 Ga. App. 501, 591 S.E.2d 374 (2003).

Id at 505, 591 S.E.2d at 377.
Id. at 501-02, 591 S.E.2d at 375.
Id. at 505, 591 S.E.2d at 377.
Shepherd Interiors, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, 263 Ga. App. 869, 870, 589 S.E.2d 640,
(2003).
263 Ga. App. 869, 589 S.E.2d 640 (2003).
Id. at 870, 589 S.E.2d at 641.
Id at 871, 589 S.E.2d at 642.
Id at 870, 589 S.E.2d at 642.
264 Ga. App. 620, 591 S.E.2d 487 (2003).

150. Id. at 621, 591 S.E.2d at 488.
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sued Jackson and Wright for injuries suffered in an automobile collision.
Jackson's defense was that she had been desperately trying to escape
from Wright's home where Wright had secretly drugged her in an
attempt to rape her. Wright's defense to Jackson's accusations was that
he did not need to give Jackson a drug to have sex with her because he
had hired her to have sex for money that night, just as he had done on
seven or eight other occasions. Not surprisingly, Jackson moved to
exclude any evidence that she was a prostitute on the basis that such
evidence was highly prejudicial. The trial court ruled that Wright's
testimony concerning Jackson's reason for coming to his house the night
of the collision was admissible, but evidence that Jackson was a
prostitute was to be allowed only for impeachment purposes.151 The
court of appeals determined there was no abuse of discretion and
affirmed the trial court's ruling. 5 2 The lesson is simple: even highly
prejudicial evidence is admissible if it closely embraces contested issues.
Questionable conduct of a highly prejudicial nature, which occurs after
the incident giving rise to a lawsuit, may be admissible when punitive
damages are at issue. In Craig v. Holsey,'" defendant moved to
exclude evidence of his continued marijuana use after the accident that
was the subject of the lawsuit. The evidence was admitted because it
showed defendant had not been deterred by his criminal conviction, and
that punitive damages could be appropriate.'"
Two cases during this survey period illustrate when an expert may
properly offer an opinion on whether a defendant breached the standard
of care. In Applebrook Country Dayschool, Inc. v. Thurman,1" the
court of appeals reversed a verdict for plaintiffs because their expert had
testified to the wrong standard of care and repeatedly stated that
defendants breached the inapplicable standard." The case involved
a child's death at a daycare center, and the proper standard was that of
a "reasonable parent." The expert repeatedly testified that defendant
had breached a different standard-the standard practices in the day
care industry. 5 ' Furthermore, because an expert may not testify to
the ultimate issue, when that issue is one such that the jury can reach
a conclusion without the aid of expert testimony, the expert's testimony

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Id.
Id.
264 Ga. App. 344, 590 S.E.2d 742 (2003).
Id. at 347-48, 590 S.E.2d at 747.
264 Ga. App. 591, 591 S.E.2d 406 (2003).
Id. at 593, 591 S.E.2d at 409-10.
Id. at 592, 591 S.E.2d at 408-09.
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that defendant breached this standard of care was improper.158 Thus,
testimony on whether the daycare center's employee acted as a
"reasonable parent" was within the "ken of the average laymen," making
expert testimony on the ultimate issue inappropriate and justifying the
reversal of a verdict for plaintiffs.' 59
In contrast, in Bennett v. Mullally,'" a police officer's expert testimony about a motor vehicle accident was found to be properly admitted
when the police officer limited his opinions to the cause of the accident
16
and did not offer an opinion on whether the driver was negligent.'
These cases show the importance of precisely identifying the standard
of care and reining in your experts to make sure they do not testify
about the ultimate issue, unless the standard of care in a given case
requires special knowledge or expertise.
3. Jury Instruction. In reversing the court of appeals, the Georgia
Supreme Court held, in Critser v. McFadden,62 that the trial court's
instructions to the jury to consider various negligence elements in a set
order amounted to reversible error.' 63 After noting that Georgia law
"does not impose any requirement that the jury address [the elements
of negligence] in any particular order," the court explained: "A charge
which restricts the order for addressing the constituent elements of a
negligence claim can have the harmful effect of precluding the jury from
giving proper consideration to the totality of
the facts and circumstances
4
relevant to the ultimate determination."'6
4. Voir Dire. During this survey period, the court of appeals
emphasized the importance of adequate voir dire for purposes of
determining whether prospective jurors should be stricken for cause. In
Bennett v. Mullally,' the court approved the grant of a new trial
based on the presiding judge's failure to conduct voir dire adequate to
the situation."6 In Bennett plaintiff moved for a new trial after the
jury returned a defense verdict, arguing that "she was unduly prejudiced
because the judge who presided over her trial failed to strike two jurors
for cause" despite the fact that those jurors' responses during voir dire

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 592-93, 591 S.E.2d at 409.
Id. at 592, 591 S.E.2d at 408.
263 Ga. App. 215, 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003).
Id. at 219, 587 S.E.2d at 389.
277 Ga. 653, 593 S.E.2d 330 (2004).
Id. at 656, 593 S.E.2d at 333.
Id. at 654-55, 593 S.E.2d at 332.
263 Ga. App. 215, 587 S.E.2d 385 (2003).
Id. at 218, 587 S.E.2d at 388.
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revealed their incurable bias." 7 For example, those jurors stated
"there are maybe a few too many lawsuits today" and that they would
not award damages for pain and suffering because "expenses [are] the
only thing that should be recoverable."'" The court explained that
when bias is shown during voir dire, "the trial court must do more than
'rehabilitate' the juror through the use of any talismanic question. The
court is statutorily bound to conduct voir dire adequate to the situation
"169

L.

Miscellaneous
In an important and well-reasoned opinion, the court of appeals
reaffirmed the long-standing principle that compliance with the law is
not a defense to negligence. 70 In Sinclair Disposal Service, Inc. v.
Ochoa,'7 ' the court of appeals rejected defendants' argument that
O.C.G.A. section 40-6-203(c) 172 allows a waste disposal vehicle to stop
in the middle of the road with absolute impunity, so long as the vehicle's
hazard lights are flashing. 17 The court recognized that Georgia's
Uniform Rules of the Road 7 4 set forth "a minimum rather than a
maximum standard of care, and a motorist may not assume that because
rules laid down by statute accord him certain rights and preferences he
may avail himself thereof regardless of the rights and safety of
others." 75
III.

LEGISLATION

VacatingArbitrationAwards
O.C.G.A. section 9-9-13,17" which provides when an arbitration
award may be vacated, was amended July 1, 2003, to allow a vacation
"177
of such an award for the "arbitrator's manifest disregard of the law.

A.

167.

Id. at 216, 587 S.E.2d at 387.

168. Id. at 217, 587 S.E.2d at 387-88.
169. Id. at 217-18, 587 S.E.2d at 388 (quoting Kim v. Walls, 275 Ga. 177, 178, 563
S.E.2d 847, 849 (2002)).

170. Sinclair Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Ochoa, 265 Ga. App. 172, 174, 593 S.E.2d 358, 360
(2004).
171.

172.
173.
174.
175.
Smith,
176.
177.

265 Ga. App. 172, 593 S.E.2d 358 (2004).

O.C.G.A. § 40-6-203(c) (2004).
SinclairDisposal Serv., 265 Ga. App. at 173, 593 S.E.2d at 360.
O.C.G.A. § 40-6-1 (2004).
SinclairDisposal Serv., 265 Ga. App. at 173, 593 S.E.2d at 360 (quoting Lusk v.
110 Ga. App. 36, 39, 137 S.E.2d 734, 737 (1964)).
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13 (2004).
2003 Ga. Laws 363. This bill was enacted on June 4, 2003.
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This statutory amendment abrogates the Georgia Supreme Court's
inexplicable decision in Progressive Data Systems, Inc. v. Jefferson
Randolph Corp. 7 '
B.

Prejudgment and Postjudgment Interest

The amount of interest collectable on judgments and on unpaid presuit demands for unliquidated damages has been changed from twelve
percent to three percent over the published prime rate on the day that
judgment is entered. 7 9 Also noteworthy is the Georgia General
Assembly's deletion of the limitation that a written notice "of a demand
for an amount of unliquidated damages in a tort action" be given on only
one occasion.'i 0
C.

Voluntary Dismissal of Lawsuits

O.C.G.A section 9-11-41(a)18 ' has been amended so that a "second
notice of [voluntary] dismissal [by the plaintiff] operates as an adjudication on the merits." 82 Additionally, voluntary dismissal may now only
be effected without the court's permission by either "filing a written
notice of dismissal at any time before the first witness is sworn; or...
[bly filing a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have
appeared in the action."" a
D.

Class Action Certifications

O.C.G.A. section 9-11-23,' 4 the Civil Practice Act's class action rule,
has been amended to conform partially to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23."s However, there are still several significant differences
between the federal rule and section 9-11-23."86 Practitioners should

178. 275 Ga. 420, 568 S.E.2d 474 (2002). See also Jason Crawford et al., TrialPractice
and Procedure,55 MERCER L. REV. 439 (2003).
179. O.C.GA § 7-4-12 (2004).
180. 2003 Ga. Laws 363.
181. O.C.GA. § 9-11-41(a) (2004).
182. Id. § 9-11-41(a)(3) (2003). The previously enacted statute provided that a third
notice of dismissal would act as an adjudication upon the merits of a plaintiff's case. Id.
§ 9-11-41(a) (2002) (emphasis added).
183. Id. § 9-11-41(aX1) (2003). The previously enacted statute provided that a plaintiff
may voluntarily dismiss his or her case "at any time before the plaintiff rests his case."
Id. 9-11-41(a) (2002).
184. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-23 (2004).
185. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a), (b).
186. Contrast O.C.GA. § 9-11-23(c), (d), (e), and (f) with FED. R. CIrv. P. 23 (c), (d)(5),

(e), (0, (g), and (h).
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exercise caution relying on federal law in this area, particularly when
the rules still differ.
E.

Transfer of Structured Settlement Payments

In order to comply with the requirements of O.C.G.A. section 51-1271(a),18 7 the transfer of structured settlement payments must now be
"approved in advance in a final court order by a court of competent
jurisdiction or order of any government authority vested by law with
exclusive jurisdiction over the settled claim resolved by the structured
settlement based on express findings of the court or government
A hearing shall be held to determine whether such a
authority."'8
transfer should be authorized, and notice must be given to the court and
8s
all interested parties of information pertinent to the transfer.
O.C.G.A. section 51-12-71'90 has been amended further to include
among its requirements for transfer of a structured settlement such
provisions as: The transfer may not contravene any court order or any
responsible administrative authority; and the transfer must be "in the
best interest of the payee taking into account the welfare and support of
the payee's dependents."''
F

Forum Non Conveniens

Georgia courts have now been provided with a list of statutory factors
to consider when deciding whether Georgia is the most proper forum for
a civil action brought by a nonresident of Georgia. l" These factors
are:
(1) [tlhe place of accrual of the cause of action; (2) the location of
witnesses; (3) [tlhe residence or residences of the parties; (4) [wlhether
a litigant is attempting to circumvent the applicable statute of limitations of another state; and (5) [t]he public factor of the convenience to
and burden upon the court."9 3
A court may dismiss an action without prejudice if a motion to dismiss
for forum non conveniens is: (1) "filed not later than [ninety] days after

187. O.C.G.A. § 51-12-71(a) (2004).
188. Id.
189. Id. § 51-12-71(b), (c) (2003); see also O.C.G.A. § 51-12-72 (2003). Venue for an
application to transfer the structured settlement and the accompanying hearing "shall be
in the county in which any transferee or transferor resides or in any county in which any
of the transferees or transferors have consented to venue." O.C.G.A. § 51-12-71(d).
190. O.C.GA § 51-12-71 (2003).
191. Id. § 51-12-71(a)(2).
192. 2003 Ga. Laws 363; O.C.G.A. § 50-2-21(b) (2003).
193. O.C.G.A. § 50-2-21(b).
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the last day allowed for the filing of the moving party's answer;" (2) it
is shown that the forum is not convenient pursuant to the above-listed
factors; and (3) there is another appropriate forum for the action."
G. Mandated Alternative Dispute Resolution for Construction
Disputes
The Georgia General Assembly has enacted legislation effective May
13, 2004 providing that construction defect disputes not involving claims
of personal injury or death must be submitted through a claims process
at least ninety days before the initiation of a lawsuit or arbitration. 95
The fairly comprehensive and lengthy process of resolving these claims
without the courts or arbitrator is detailed within the codified statutes,
but one of the main thrusts of the act is the limiting of damages to a
claimant who rejects an offer of settlement by the contractor that the
ultimate fact-finder of the action later deems to have been a "reasonable"
offer of settlement."
H.

PhysicianPractice'sLiens Against Patients' Causes of Action

Physician practices have now been added to the list of medical
providers who may have a lien against a patient's personal injury cause
of action for the reasonable charges of treating the patient. 197 More
notable than the inclusion of physician practices in Georgia's personal
injury lien statutes, however, is the Georgia General Assembly's
amendment of the procedure by which medical providers must perfect
Paragraph (a)(1) of the previously enacted statute
their liens. 98
provided that medical providers had to provide written notice of the lien
to all applicable persons and entities "within thirty days after the person
Paragraph (a)(2) of the previously enacted
has been discharged.""
statute then required the medical provider to file the lien "no sooner
than fifteen days after the date of the written notice provided for in this
Code section."20°
By contrast, paragraph (a)(1) of the newly amended statute now
provides that the medical provider must provide written notice of the
lien to all applicable persons and entities "not less than [thirty] days
prior to the date of filing the statement required under paragraph (2) of

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.

Id. § 50-2-21(c).
2004 Ga. Laws 532.
O.C.G.A. § 8-2-38(1) (2004).
O.C.GJ. §§ 44-14-470 to -473, -475 to -476 (2004).
2004 Ga. Laws 486.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-471(a)(1) (2003).
Id. § 44-14-471(aX2).
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this subsection .... ."2o However, paragraph (a)(2) has been amended
to read only that the medical provider must file the lien, "no sooner than
[thirty] days after the date of the written notice provided for in this Code
section .... . 2 Because neither paragraph (a)(1) nor paragraph (a)(2)
provide a definite means of determining a proper date to give notice of
or file the lien, the new amendment unfortunately creates considerable
ambiguity regarding when a medical provider must fie a lien against a
patient's personal injury cause of action.
I. BroadcasterImmunity for Amber Alerts
O.C.G.A. section 51-1-50203 has been recently enacted to provide
some civil immunity to any broadcaster "for any civil damages from the
broadcast or other dissemination of any alert generated pursuant to the
Specifically, the
Levi's Call, Georgia's Amber Alert Program."'
immunity from civil damages will apply to broadcasters for any
broadcasts or disseminations of information made during an alert period
and within two hours after the termination of or material, substantive
change in an alert period. 0 5
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Article is not exhaustive of all developments in case and
statutory law for the survey period. However, the Authors have
attempted to address those cases and statutes that have most significantly impacted the practice and procedure of trial law in Georgia.
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